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Sharpe FinanceDID YOU KNOWnext in 7s
The most-called smart contract function across all EVM chains is approve(). The second-most is the one people forget they ran.
Morpho Blue · Aave V3 · 11 chains · scoring refreshed every 5 min
The most-called smart contract function across all EVM chains is approve(). The second-most is the one people forget they ran.
crvUSD supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
** You deposit crvUSD (a stablecoin issued by Curve) and it gets lent to borrowers on Aave Ethereum. You earn a variable 0.99% APY, which comes from the 2.96% rate borrowers pay, reduced by the 42.4% utilization and Aave's 20% fee. You can redeem anytime at the $106.9k available liquidity—but the supply cap is fully consumed, so new deposits may fail until the cap is raised.
** Aave governance (Risk Council / BGD Labs) operates this reserve. No paused, frozen, or isolation flags; it remains borrow-only by design, signaling that crvUSD is not considered safe collateral for Aave's lending pools.
** The 0.99% supply APY is mechanically set by borrower demand (2.96% borrow rate × 42% utilization × 80% pass-through). At 42% utilization, the rate is stable and far from the compression zone; demand would need to drop sharply to materially shrink yield.
** The supply cap is 100% consumed—new deposits will revert until governance raises it. The reserve factor (20%) is moderate. The Sharpe risk score is 10/100, placing crvUSD in the lowest decile. Curve can alter crvUSD mechanics or issuer behavior; oracle or peg risk is not currently flagged but remains residual.
** Avoid if you need redemption certainty today; good fit only if you can accept potential deposit-rejection and accept crvUSD issuer risk.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
This reserve isn't usable as collateral, so LTV / Liquidation LLTV / liquidation bonus don't apply. Borrowers can take it against other collateral; suppliers earn the variable rate driven by borrow demand.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
Supply cap is 100% filled. New deposits revert once the cap binds; cap raises require an on-chain governance vote.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.