Stablecoin issuers are now among the top 20 holders of US Treasury bills.
Stablecoin issuers are now among the top 20 holders of US Treasury bills.
GHO supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
You deposit GHO (Aave's native stablecoin) and it gets lent out to borrowers at 4.08% variable APY. Your supply earns 0.00% because Aave's treasury captures 100% of borrower interest as reserve factor — you receive nothing, the protocol keeps it all. GHO is borrow-only, so it cannot be used as collateral to secure other loans. You can redeem your deposit only if liquidity is available; currently $23.60M sits liquid against $135.15M supplied, meaning the reserve is at its supply cap and new deposits will likely fail.
Aave governance (Aave Chan Initiative / Risk Council) has set GHO borrow-only and locked the supply cap at full utilization, signaling intent to constrain GHO supply while the protocol stabilizes its utility.
Supply APY is zero because the reserve factor is 100% — every dollar of borrower interest flows to Aave's treasury, leaving suppliers nothing. At 82.5% utilization, borrow demand is strong but the rate's stability depends on whether utilization stays near or above that level; if it drops sharply, APY could fall further.
Supply cap is fully consumed; deposits will revert until utilization falls or cap is raised. Redemptions queue if more than $23.60M is withdrawn simultaneously. GHO is protocol-native with no external issuer, limiting third-party freeze risk but tying solvency to Aave's own health.
Avoid if you expect yield — this reserve pays 0%. Consider only if you need GHO liquidity or want to exit GHO without market slippage, and can tolerate potential redemption delay.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
This reserve isn't usable as collateral, so LTV / Liquidation LLTV / liquidation bonus don't apply. Borrowers can take it against other collateral; suppliers earn the variable rate driven by borrow demand.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
Supply cap is 100% filled. New deposits revert once the cap binds; cap raises require an on-chain governance vote.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.