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Sharpe FinanceDID YOU KNOWnext in 7s
More USDT exists than there are US dollars in the M0 base of several mid-sized countries.
Morpho Blue · Aave V3 · 11 chains · scoring refreshed every 5 min
More USDT exists than there are US dollars in the M0 base of several mid-sized countries.
KNC supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
You deposit KNC (Kyber Network's governance token) into this reserve and it gets lent out to borrowers who pay a variable interest rate; you earn 0.55% APY on your deposit. KNC is enabled for borrowing only—you cannot use it as collateral to borrow other assets. Your deposit is redeemable at the reserve's available liquidity ($5.5k of the $6.7k supplied). The supply rate is set by borrow demand: borrowers pay 3.78% variable APY, Aave's treasury takes 20% of that (the reserve factor), and you keep the rest.
The reserve is currently **frozen** by Aave governance, meaning no new deposits or withdrawals are allowed—this signals governance's intent to wind down KNC supply.
Supply APY (0.55%) comes entirely from the 3.78% borrow rate net of the 20% reserve factor. Utilization is low at 18.6%, so borrow demand is thin; the rate is stable but unlikely to rise meaningfully unless borrowing picks up.
**Reserve frozen by governance** is the material risk—you cannot withdraw or deposit until governance unfreezes it. The deterministic risk score of 50/100 (composite) reflects moderate underlying asset and liquidity risk; the freeze is a governance action, not a technical defect.
Avoid—deposit is locked until freeze is lifted. Only consider if you have a specific reason to hold KNC inside Aave long-term and tolerate illiquidity.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
This reserve isn't usable as collateral, so LTV / Liquidation LLTV / liquidation bonus don't apply. Borrowers can take it against other collateral; suppliers earn the variable rate driven by borrow demand.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
New supply and borrow are disabled; withdrawal and repay remain open. Typically applied during a deprecation glide path or when governance is unwinding exposure.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.