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Sharpe FinanceDID YOU KNOWnext in 7s
More USDT exists than there are US dollars in the M0 base of several mid-sized countries.
Morpho Blue · Aave V3 · 11 chains · scoring refreshed every 5 min
More USDT exists than there are US dollars in the M0 base of several mid-sized countries.
PT-eUSDE-29MAY2025 supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
Depositing PT-eUSDE-29MAY2025 means lending your tokens to Aave borrowers on Ethereum; you earn the variable supply APY, currently 0.00%, and can redeem your deposit at any time against the reserve's available liquidity of $213.11. This is a borrow-only reserve—it cannot be used as collateral to secure borrowed assets. The supply rate is set by borrower demand (currently zero) multiplied by utilization (0.0%) and the reserve factor (20% of interest goes to Aave's treasury).
Aave governance maintains this reserve in active status with borrow-only restrictions, signaling it is treated as a specialized or time-bound asset unsuitable for collateral use.
Supply APY is 0.00% because utilization is 0.0%—no one is borrowing against this reserve, so no interest accrues. This will remain true unless borrowing demand emerges.
Supply cap is 100% consumed at only $213.11 total, meaning new deposits will revert if the cap is not raised. Deterministic risk score is 21/100, reflecting elevated structural concerns; the underlying PT (Principal Token) expiring May 2025 introduces maturity risk and counterparty dependency not present in standard assets.
Avoid unless you are arbitraging a specific yield-farming opportunity or settling a prior position—zero yield and deposit rejection risk make this unsuitable for general allocation.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
This reserve isn't usable as collateral, so LTV / Liquidation LLTV / liquidation bonus don't apply. Borrowers can take it against other collateral; suppliers earn the variable rate driven by borrow demand.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
Supply cap is 100% filled. New deposits revert once the cap binds; cap raises require an on-chain governance vote.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.