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Sharpe FinanceDID YOU KNOWnext in 7s
More USDT exists than there are US dollars in the M0 base of several mid-sized countries.
Morpho Blue · Aave V3 · 11 chains · scoring refreshed every 5 min
More USDT exists than there are US dollars in the M0 base of several mid-sized countries.
PT-sUSDE-27NOV2025 supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
You deposit PT-sUSDE-27NOV2025, a Pendle principal token expiring November 2025, and it is lent out to borrowers. Because this reserve is borrow-only, you cannot use it as collateral for your own loans. Your supply earns the variable rate, which is currently 0.00% APY because no one is borrowing against this reserve right now. You can redeem your deposit only if liquidity becomes available—currently all $958 supplied is sitting idle.
Aave governance has flagged this reserve with a supply cap now at 100% consumption, signaling either winding down or capacity constraint. The borrow-only status reflects governance's view that the asset is unsuitable as collateral.
Supply APY is 0.00% because utilization is 0.0%—no borrowing demand. With a 45% reserve factor, any future borrow APY would be split 55% to you and 45% to Aave's treasury. Expect no yield unless borrow demand materializes.
Supply cap is nearly full; new deposits will revert. The asset itself carries a deterministic risk score of 22/100, placing it in the higher-risk bucket. PT-sUSDE expires in November 2025—after expiry the token may cease to function, creating redemption risk.
Avoid—no yield, no collateral utility, deposit queue risk, and token expiry within ~12 months create compounding friction. Only suitable for traders briefly parking PT before expiry.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
This reserve isn't usable as collateral, so LTV / Liquidation LLTV / liquidation bonus don't apply. Borrowers can take it against other collateral; suppliers earn the variable rate driven by borrow demand.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
Supply cap is 100% filled. New deposits revert once the cap binds; cap raises require an on-chain governance vote.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.