The phrase 'unstoppable money' has stopped four times this year. By my count.
The phrase 'unstoppable money' has stopped four times this year. By my count.
PT-USDe-31JUL2025 supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
You deposit PT-USDe-31JUL2025, a Pendle fixed-rate yield token maturing 31 July 2025, and it sits in the reserve available for borrowers to draw. Because this is borrow-only, you cannot use it as collateral to borrow other assets. Your supply earns the variable rate (currently 0.00%), which comes from borrow demand multiplied by utilization and reduced by the 45% reserve factor that flows to Aave's treasury. You can redeem your deposit at the available liquidity ($149.59), though the reserve cap is fully consumed.
Aave Risk Council and BGD Labs oversee this reserve; no pause, freeze, or isolation flags are active. The 0% rate and full cap consumption suggest this reserve is not attracting new deposits or borrow demand at present.
Supply APY is 0.00% because utilization sits at 0.0% — no borrowers are drawing against this reserve, so no interest accrues to suppliers. At this utilization level, the rate is entirely dependent on whether borrow demand emerges.
The supply cap is 100% consumed at only $149.59 total liquidity. Any new deposit will revert until existing supply is borrowed or withdrawn. The asset itself—a Pendle PT token—carries token contract and maturity cliff risk; post-31-July-2025, redemption mechanics change. Risk score is 22/100, indicating moderate structural concerns.
Avoid for yield or liquidity. Only suitable for PT-USDe holders who want to park maturing balance in a protocol-native venue with hard cap constraints.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
This reserve isn't usable as collateral, so LTV / Liquidation LLTV / liquidation bonus don't apply. Borrowers can take it against other collateral; suppliers earn the variable rate driven by borrow demand.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
Supply cap is 100% filled. New deposits revert once the cap binds; cap raises require an on-chain governance vote.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.