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Sharpe FinanceDID YOU KNOWnext in 7s
The Ethereum mainnet holds more deployed smart contracts than addresses that have ever signed a transaction.
Morpho Blue · Aave V3 · 11 chains · scoring refreshed every 5 min
The Ethereum mainnet holds more deployed smart contracts than addresses that have ever signed a transaction.
RLUSD supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
You deposit RLUSD (Ripple's USD stablecoin) into Aave Ethereum and lend it to borrowers who pay a variable interest rate. You earn 2.20% annually, paid from the interest borrowers pay minus a 20% cut that goes to Aave's treasury. RLUSD is borrow-only — you cannot use it as collateral to borrow other assets. Your deposit is redeemable at the available liquidity rate; currently $1.79M is available against $4.64M supplied.
Aave Risk Council and BGD Labs govern RLUSD reserve parameters; no pause, freeze, or isolation flags are active.
The 2.20% supply APY reflects 61.4% utilization and borrower demand at 4.52% variable APY. At 61% utilization, rate swings are moderate — the rate will stay reasonably stable unless utilization jumps above 80% or falls sharply.
Ripple controls RLUSD issuance and can freeze tokens or halt redemptions at its discretion, a material counterparty risk. This is the dominant risk factor; Aave governance has not mitigated it through additional controls.
Good fit for short-term liquidity provision if you accept Ripple's operational control over the asset; avoid if you require censorship-resistance or full redemption certainty.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
This reserve isn't usable as collateral, so LTV / Liquidation LLTV / liquidation bonus don't apply. Borrowers can take it against other collateral; suppliers earn the variable rate driven by borrow demand.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
RLUSD is a centrally-issued asset (Ripple). The issuer can freeze specific addresses (including aToken holders) and may comply with regulatory demands that affect this reserve. Aave is the secondary-market exposure layer; the primary obligation sits with Ripple.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.