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Sharpe FinanceDID YOU KNOWnext in 7s
Stablecoin issuers are now among the top 20 holders of US Treasury bills.
Morpho Blue · Aave V3 · 11 chains · scoring refreshed every 5 min
Stablecoin issuers are now among the top 20 holders of US Treasury bills.
weETH supply on Aave V3 (Ethereum). Read-only on Sharpe — deposits, withdrawals, and borrows execute on app.aave.com. We surface parameters, rates, and risk so you can compare this reserve against Morpho vaults on the same asset cohort.
Plain-English summary of this vault — what it does, who runs it, where the yield comes from, and what could break it. Generated from the same deterministic inputs shown elsewhere on this page; the numbers are the source, this is just the explanation.
Deposit weETH (EtherFi's liquid staked ETH token) on Ethereum and it gets lent to borrowers; you earn the variable borrow rate (1.01% APY) multiplied by utilization and net of Aave's 45% fee, which currently yields 0.00% because utilization is zero. WeETH is enabled as collateral at 78% LTV for standard borrowing and 93% LTV within eMode (for ETH-correlated assets), meaning you can borrow against it; it's redeemable at whatever liquidity remains after borrows, now $3.62B of $3.62B. EtherFi stands behind weETH redemption.
Aave Risk Council and BGD Labs govern this reserve; no paused, frozen, or isolation flags. The supply cap is 97% consumed, signaling governance has set a tight ceiling and deposits may begin reverting when full.
Supply APY is borrower interest minus Aave's 45% reserve factor. At 0% utilization, there is zero borrow demand and thus zero yield. If utilization remains this low, expect 0.00% APY to persist until borrowing picks up.
Supply cap nearly full (97% consumed) means new deposits will revert once the cap is breached. EtherFi's solvency and weETH's peg to ETH are material dependencies; a 21/100 risk score reflects moderate structural and counterparty concerns.
Avoid if seeking yield; useful only if you need weETH as collateral for borrowing on Aave and prefer to earn zero rather than hold it off-chain.
On Aave V3, a supplier can withdraw up to the reserve's available liquidity instantly. Above that, the withdrawal must wait for borrowers to repay or new suppliers to deposit. Markets at 95%+ utilization can keep large redemptions waiting for hours to days at current rates.
Reserve parameters are set by Aave governance (BGD Labs + Aave Chan Initiative + Risk Council). Listings, caps, IRM curves, and LLTVs change through on-chain votes.
Borrowers in this eMode category operate against a raised LTV / LLTV against correlated assets. The on-chain liquidation surface for this reserve is the eMode LLTV, not the base — supply-side risk is calibrated to the higher figure when the borrower opts in.
On Aave V3, supply APY = borrow APY × utilization × (1 − reserve factor). There is no curator skim; the only intermediation cost is the reserve factor, which funds the Aave treasury. No emissions slice in v1 of this integration — the headline is fully sustainable.
Aave V3 reserves carry parameter risk (LTV/LLTV adequacy vs collateral volatility), liquidity risk (high utilization slows exit), and depeg risk on the underlying. Governance can pause / freeze / adjust caps in response to incidents. Sharpe's full risk decomposition for Aave reserves rolls in v1.1.
How the composite risk score breaks down. Every number traces to an explicit input — /methodology documents each factor's formula.
Per-collateral decomposition: Sharpe-style realized σ from 30 daily log returns, blended 50/50 with the asset-taxonomy tier fallback. Phase 2 will replace the tier slot with liquidity depth, mechanism classification, and holder concentration. Methodology in /methodology.
The honest version. Every structural failure mode this vault is exposed to, ranked by severity. If you want to know whether to invest, start here.
Supply cap is 97% filled. New deposits revert once the cap binds; cap raises require an on-chain governance vote.
Aave V3 prices and liquidations route through Chainlink's aggregator feed for this asset. A stale, manipulated, or wrong-side update is the protocol's largest single-point-of-failure for this reserve. Chainlink has a strong track record but the failure mode is binary.